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an 1.1 ). 
Table 1.1: Distribution 1->,.",,,.,,,,,, Deficits in 1997-2006 
1997-2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Countries with a deficit 43 43 42 40 36 32 
Less than 3 11 7 6 9 7 
3-5 4 7 8 5 8 3 
More than 5 28 29 28 26 21 23 
Countries with a 4 4 5 7 11 15 
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to a 
GDP to 18.1 ""' .. ,'''' ... + 
30 
1 
Table 1.2: Distribution of External Debt in 1997-2006 
1997-2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Less than 30 6 5 6 8 12 18 
30-60 8 7 13 13 14 12 
60.1-80 10 12 6 6 8 4 
More than 80 20 20 19 17 10 10 
Total number of countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Sources: IMF and WEO 
Table 1.3: Distribution ofInflation in 1997-2006 
1997-2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Less than 0 0 4 6 5 0 
0-5 24 22 15 24 19 19 
5.1-10 12 7 13 3 14 14 
10.1-20 4 10 8 12 10 10 
More than 20 7 4 5 3 4 3 
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2 See Welcome Address by the former CBN Dr. J. Sanusi on 2004 Federal 
Government an Address the immediate former CBN Professor c.c. 











opt imistic revenue outcomes recorded over the pust y~urs and the dec lillillg 
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In addition, unlike in Nigeria. figure 1.1, ",ve~ls lh~l ~Imo't half of the South 
Alrican uOIneslic debt i ~ helu by public I(,llowed b~' ('omm~",ial bank. the 
Res~rve Bank of South Africa was ~I l but ab>ent. 
Further. wc eXJlil inc tllc history nnd prospects of domestic govcrnmcnt markcts 
in Nigeri~ ami South Africa, Dcbt markels c~n bc uscful to dfici~nt financing 
of a susl~inabl e budgct dcflc it. Lxpericncc in cmcrging markcts and industrial 
countries has :JJo'\I' thJt market·bnsed borrowing in deep nnd wcll · financing 
domestic dcbt mJrkets can avoid the nlonctmy consequences and interest rme 

















NIGERIA SOUTH AFRICA Sub-Saharan AFRICA 
Year Fin Domestic External Fin Domestic External Fin Domestic External 
1980-1989 17 13 44 I 56 31 11 49 
1990-1994 21 37 95 I 53 35 1 30 12 87 
1995-2000 27 20 40 I 56 41 2 32 15 103 
2001-2006 29 16 46 I 68 29 5 43 22 34 
Source: IMF 
































I Standard Deviation 
1 155.23 






3 It measures the difference between the of a dollar-denominated bond issued a non-
US market economy over a corresponding bond issued the US - or the 
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may not 
an ap}:lroJ)riate 
5 The of fiscal authorities to affect monetary commitment is also in Dixit and 
Lambertini and conclude that fiscal discretion 
'destr,oys monetary commitment' and as such rules on behavior. 
This is the idea behind the of fiscal constraints which has been central in the 
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7 In which case, the level will have to rise for the government "'1",~r_'-"'TY> 
constraint to on this may result in an between inflation 
and fiscal policy 
that for countries in which accounts for a small of the total 
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S;O 1 + r 
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inflation rate between 
10 (1) is derived from a pure m><",t,j-" 
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net 
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ii 
nrr,nPFt1c'C of the model and the 
conclusions can be different. With such a 
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gerlenltes a new eqllilibrium IS satIsfIed at a 
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Wlllm~~ne~~s to statJIW~e 
"'lUlUH.l]' ttlfOllgh a change 
12 (1991), Sims and Canzoneri and Diba all the 
pos:81ble rules that prc,vlcle the same condition than 
stfllllgent rules than the one illustrated can the same "Ricardian" result 
analvs<~s the same rules in a union and concludes 










stance. !J'-"LiU'.U",'- cannot 
a 
~O~/elnt1r1ell1tS are _~. __ •• 1 
to 
1 It 






13 if the real value of omJPrlnmpnt debt were to 
grow 
line. Put 
(11) for all values of P. 
As Christiano and 
this would 
is not calibrated to satisfy the i.,+"rt""",,,",,,w<> 
in their view, is one of the py,,,nrllP" 
O()'llPrnmipn"r" commit themselves to a fiscal 
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17 In enter '>L~~AU.LH.,<.UJ 
18 




1 lUI~H\_1;: of a 
17 Using a small short run model of the Brazilian economy, Favero et al (2004) demonstrate 
how a failure in fiscal for leaves interest rate increases to 
restrain inflation in Brazil between 2002 and 
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discussed in 2, this is one of the used to test the FTPD 
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offuture Liab to current 
Order Order 
(-) positive 
non negative +) non (0, +) 
negative (-) negative H 
& 
Dominance 
Auto Psurp Regime 
+ MD 
+ FD 
- Unidentified (N!) 
-- Un identified (NI) 
Psurb is government revenue less its expenditure net federal interest payment) and divided by nominal GDP. Liab is 
the net federal debt to the money base divided by nominal GOP. 
Liab, which is consistent with a non Ricardian or FD characteri7.ed by an active fiscal 
Psurp, which is consistent with a Ricardian or MD characterized by a fiscal policy and 
active monetary Results are however, consistent under both orderings. 










21 As Christiano et al (2000) and Canzoneri et al response of 



















A"""'IJU,,,,, of future 
FD 
MD 
Note: This is based on the sign of the impulse response function of the following V AR model; log of nominalliabilities-> Surplus 
iGDP-> log of nominal income, 
IS 
a 




or,"\"rth rate inflation rate. 
22 See Woodford (I 
23 gap is estimated using Hedrick Prescott. The lambda is set to a value of 










ensures rate IS 
IS 
error deCOlmtlOsltl(m are 
COITeS:POlndstogo,renlm~~n revenue 




(all in ECOWAS 
Morocco and Tunisia (in AMU 
and SA DC members. 
25 The use of different data sources when total debt for many countries 
reduces the statistical power of these results. However the use of different econometric tests 
and to the relative of and fiscal determinants of 










For a eaus~l insp.;ction of the underlying tillle scries, figurc 3.1 plot,; the 
prilllary surpluscs to GOP ~nd governlllcnt liabi lities to GOP r~tios for IhG 
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Interesting ly, the scatter diagram supports the existclKe of a ncgative 
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on 





26 There is no time trend in the model for all countries (the 
at all conventional levels) for 















































Psurp and Liab 
Psurp 
Psurp and Liab 
Psurp and Liab 
All monetary variables used in the analysis are stationary 
3.4 

























a constant IS on 
Table 3.4: V AR on and Liab 
SADC 
So",h Af,i~ } + + MD 
Lesotho CMA + + + + FD 
Swaziland + + MD 
Botswana + + + + FD 
Mauritius + + MD 
Tanzania + + + NI 
Malawi + + + + FD 
NI 
Zambia + + NI 
Zimbabwe + + + + FD 
COMESA 
Ethiopia + + + + FD 
Kenya -/+ -/+ + + NI 
Rwanda NI 
+ + + + FD 
ECOWAS 
CFA Franc + + MD 
+ + MD 
+ + MD 
Ghana -/+ -/+ + + NI 
AMU 
Morocco + + + + FD 
Tunisia + + + + FD 




















30 These are consistent with the similar study Fanzza and (2006), and 
Baldini and Ribeiro 
31 The identification here for six countries is less "I"\lmn,,,rf'r! to thirteen countries found in 











3 one a constant is 
Table 3.5: V AR on of and of Nominal GDP 
of future nominal of future psurp 
Income to current psurp to current 
SADC 
South CAfA 0/+ + MO 
Lesotho + FO 
Swaziland 0/+ + MO 
Botswana + FO 
Mauritius 0/+ + MO 
Tanzania 0/+ NI 
Malawi + FO 
01+ + NI 
Zambia 0/+ NI 
Zimbabwe 0/+ + FO 
COMESA 
+ FO 
0/+ + NI 
Rwanda NI 
Uganda 0/+ + FO 
ECOWAS 
CF'A Franc 01+ + MO 
0/+ + MD 
0/+ + MD 
Ghana 0/+ + NI 
AMU 
Morocco + FO 
Tunisia + FO 
Note 

































Table 3.6: Variance on Inflation 
Inflation 
SADC 
South MD 22.0% 5.8% 
CMA FD 5.0% 28.9% 
MD 3.8% 19.0% .. 
FD 11.9% 15.5% 
Mauritius MD 7.3% 6.3% 
Tanzania NI 19.6% 11.8% 
Malawi FD 23.5% 37.6% 
NI 2.6% 17.0% 
Zambia NI 3.9% 55.6% 
Zimbabwe I'D 13.9% 26.0% 
COMESA 
FD 1.57% 3.51% 
NI 13.2% 1.7% 
Rwanda NI 11.3% 3.75% 
FD 0.93% 20.5% 
ECOWAS 
CFA franc MD 0.07% 0.13% 
MD 3.26% 2.32% 
MD 1.53% 0.28% 
Ghana NI 0.51% 1.54% 
AMU 
Morocco FD 6.77% ]0.0% 
Tunisia FD 0.28% 2.45% 
Note 
VAR Nominal money Real output gap-> Inflation 
are average value of the variance for 
seem to 
matter terms 










ri~1I1'O 3"~, Vorin« 1I0<fi1~I'O,itio" on [nfloli"" V",iobilily 
SiJulh AlTica Sw".u.il ... d 
"1 auri I ill, "Mawi 
Zambia Zimb.bwe •• 
. _. 
Mali 











seem to an 
Table 3.7: SUmll1l81"yResults orthe Three Annrr.", .. 'hp!O 
First Second Third 
SADC 
South MD MD MD 
CMA FD FD FD 
MD MD MD 
Botswana FD FD FD 
Mauritius MD MD MD 
Tanzania NI NI NT 
Malawi FD FD FD 
NI NI NI 
Zambia NI NI NI 
Zimbabwe FD FD FD 
COMESA 
FD FD FD 
NI NT NI 
Rwanda NI NI NT 
FD FD FD 
ECOWAS 
CFA Franc MD MD MD 
MD MD MD 
MD MD MD 
Ghana NI NT NI 
AMU 
Morocco FD FD FD 
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found in that country, sUll~ge:stlrlg that one may not 
~'UHV"~"'p between liabilities and means that 
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+ + + 
+ + (4.6) 
36 
''''''1-''-''''-''' to an 
as a mcme:tal'v 
to 
.~,n"'L.'H,", manner to a 
IS 
are 
... ",.uu.u test. 
are 
or 
no IS not 
37 
36 The lambda is set to a value of I 00 as it is for annual data. 
37 When a value of the variable appears as a regressor, the 
squares first-differenced estimator and a Arellano-Bond estimator 











38 The reason for 
IS 
''''u.n.'''' are not 
IS 
averages is to offset potlennal 
out 
.. 















Note: There is considerable n"'~n"n 
the countries in COMESA also 
is also a member of COMESA 
.. 










Variable Ob. "".n Std.Dev 
~rjmdry _"" ~Vl l!~ 110 ,- 1172 :) . ~77? 
Liiloilities 140 I 0 ~1 . 72 C , 08 OG9' 
()\' t",.,r '"P , 40 . . 1 /8JC , 62U7C 
A nrst aso.essment of the data can be made in order to check th~ nature and 
magnitude of the existing correlation hetwecn tlw primary surplus and the 
I iahi lities ratios_ For instance. such correlation i, [legati ve around -0.26 for the 
entire sample ~nd ·0.25 for the sub-sample peri()d 1992-2006. The ",aHer 
diagram in figllre 4_1 ~lso supports the exis t~nee of a nef\at,w relati()nship 
heh vcen primary surpluses and government liabilities in Africa b()th for full 
sample and sub-sample period,. 
FigUl"e 4.1, COI'"oto,io" bo'''' •• n Primor)' ~"rph", .. "ud p.bti< Li.bitili . , (in % "r GDp) 
19&2-2001, 
o .' 
' .. .' 
" ,.' 
~' " " : -------
~~ ------
, ------- ----
Although this negative r~l~ti"nship Illllftlt hi: viewed I ndi ~ativc 0flh~ c~istc nce 
"f~11 :1,--11) regime. the pr~sencc ()f an FD regime w""ld ab() ha\e pmduccd the 
ne f\ativ~ correlation between prinwry surpluses and government liabilities_ 
This is the case if ~ positive surplus/GOP innovati()n lowe" e"peded future 
surpluses sufficiently to reduce the present value. So there is an id~ntilicati"n 
prohlem here, sllggesting that simple correlations between primary surplu,~s 












root tests are 











root tests as 
is to 
39 
a, = a2 = ",= aN, null hU"nryth~'" 







39 This of test is useful for panel of moderate 
sections and 25-250 time series observations per cross """'''''''. 
between 1 0 and 250 cross 
et ai, This fits our 
data "'"'''1-''''' 










Table 4.3: Panel unit root results 
PS 1982-2006 -5.76 0.001 112 -2.24 0.006 112 
1992-2006 -2.00 0.003 91 -2.48 0.005 91 
LIB 1982-2006 -3.96 0.000 112 -1.76 0:481 112 
1992-2006 -2.38 0.001 91 -2.16 0.041 91 
GAP 1982-2006 -8.54 0.000 112 -3.32 0.000 112 
1992-2006 -6.52 0.000 91 -3.94 0.000 91 
Note: LLC- Lin and Chu. WS - Pesaran and Shin 
root tests for 




tests a test 
no en(10~~eI1Llty cannot rei (~ctf~d at 
u"Jl~"'~ cIDn(;lusionls 
test (Ha.usmam test statistil~s 
estlmatclrs.41 
dCIJendeltlt v:analble IS 













esti.mated COt~l1llClelrlt IS npor~tilJP statlstlcaljly slgmJtlcalnt at 1 
seem not to 
act 
surplulses gelrlerate:d are not 
42 
Table 4.4: FD2SLS and GMM estimators for nriim~lrv ~IH'nhl~ and liabilities 
Method 
Constant -3.85*** -3.77*** -0.35 0.17 76.79*** 64.64*** -10.28 0.35 
(0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.01) (0.78) (0.95) 
PS 0.61*** 0.26*** 6.79*** 9.09* 12.35*** 7.25*** 
(0.00) (0.03) 
LB -0.01 * -0.01 *** -0.03* -0.07*** 0.07 0.24*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
GAP -0.17 -0.12* -0.05* -0.24** 16.71 14.87* 19.09*** 24.67*** 
(0.11 ) (0.09) (0.24) (0.07) (0.00) 
N 140 140 94 112 140 140 94 112 
The coefficient *, **. *** are at the 10, 5 and I cent level 
Sargan test from the one-step GMM the null that the 
restrictions are val id. 
is conlsis1:ent a 
not to same 
IS 
to is 
>.He'''' ...... gIOVt~m]ments seem not to use pfllm;:rry sUlrplus(~s to 
liat)ili1ties to can seen we 

















can as a 
even recent 
Table 4.5: FD2SLS and GMM estimators for and liabilities 
ratio 
Method 
Constant -3.51 *** -3.58*** -0.44 0.44*** 83.81*** 79.16*** 6.11 -4.23 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.63) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.36) 
PS 0.71* 0.17* 4.26 8.21 10.51* 6.51* 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) 
LB -0.03 -0.09 -0.02* -0.09* 0.09 0.16 
(0.18) (0.10) (0.55) (0.15) 
GAP -0.10 -0.05 -0.04* -0.09* 20.02 18.80 18.99*** 24.23*** 
(0.37) (0.53) (0.06) (0.09) (0.30) (0.30) (0.01) (0.00) 
N 105 105 77 91 105 105 77 91 
The coefficient *, **, *** are 
Sargan test from the one-step GMM 












Table 4.6: FD2SLS and GMM estimators for and liabilities 
ratio 
0.04 64.56*** 67.30*** 7.73 8.46* 
(0.94) (0.00) (0.01) (0.64) (0.09) 
0.27 0.33* 3.25* 2.54 5.80*** 2.15* 
(0. (0.04) (0.10) 
-0.03* -0.02 -0.01 * -0.04* 0.09 0.16 
(0.09) (0.14) (0.07) 10) (0.15) 
-0.34* -0.27* -0.08 -0.98*** 2.37* 1.98 5.29* 2.79 
(0.69) (0.09) 15) (0.09) 
N 56 56 24 40 56 56 24 40 
The coefficient *, * *, * * * are at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level 
test from the the null that the 
restrictions are valid. 
and liabilities still 










Table 4.7: FD2SLS and GMM estimators for and liabilities 
ratio 
0.11 0.06 9.68* 8.29 5.41 9.94*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.22*** -0.04*** 0.24 0.31 * 
(0.11) (0.26) (0.01) (0.00) (0.41) (0.07) 
-0.08 -0.04 -0.l5 -0.38* 0.13 0.72 12.20* 7.70* 
(0.70) (0.09) (0.80) (0.10) (0.10) 
N 40 40 20 30 40 40 20 30 
The coefficient *, **, *** are significant at the 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. 
The Sargan test from the GMM estimator the null that the 
restrictions are valid. 















Table 4.8: FD2SLS and GMM estimators for n .. i,m!."" sur'nllls and liabilities 
ratio II ~11'I2:··2:UIU() I 
PS 0.08 12.04*** 
(0.90) (0.03) 
LB 0.18* 0.02* 0.01 0.04 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.50) (0.73) 
GAP -0.68 -0.59 -0.43 -0.65*** 
(0.20) (0.60) 
N 49 49 21 35 
The coefficient * , *** are 
test from the one-step GMM estimator 
restrictions are valid. 
on 
• 
prinlary SUllJIUS to reduce 
45 But this is at the 
In so, the CMA members 
-9.24*** -12.60*** -6.99 -0.34 
(0.01) 
1.09*** -0.01 *** 
(0.02) (0.01) 
50.57*** 45.65*** 67.03*** 0.61 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
49 49 21 35 
at the 10,5 and I cent level 
the null that the 
it 
rest corltment IS 
a 
ten.oellCY to use 
uaUBa,,_.:> or ;rnlnrrnlP 
not ch,illll;e even 
cornpl.ete control of monetary policy. 
memt)en;) are not 
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callsaJlity he1:wf~en go'verlnment revenue 
46 If gm,'emment is 
constraint due to 
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47 The most recent similar works on Africa Dore and (2000), 
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There has been some form offiscol Jdjustment in the jatter periods thollgh. bllt 
Can it be sustained (jiven the uncertainty in government revenue and the 
inev itable high govcrnmc"nt 'penJillg, adverse sfloch may inadveltent ly CJuse 
Jcbt 10 accumularc again (0 " poinl where it "annot be serviced", that is, where 
Ihe govcrnment is incapable 01' generating the primary SU rphlS needed 10 
stabilize. llIt1c.h less rc><.luce Ihe ,kbt 10 (jDP ral io 
10.'" 
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5.3 Causal Link between Revenues and Expenditure: 
Theory and Evidence 
As already mentioned. on the tocorctical from, there arc three main hypotheses 
Gil the causal relationship bctwcrn government expenditure and government 
revenues. nnlnei y, the spcnd-nnd-rcvclluc bYJXltbcsis. the rcvcnllcs'~l\d-spcnd 
hypothes is attd the fi scal synchron iz,ltiott hypothesis. 
rhe spcnd-~Ild-rcvcnuc hypothesis holds that .1 chongc ill spending iC.lds to 
ch<lllgcs in r~vcnllcs. implying that there is n unidircction<ll causality funning 
frC>tn government expenditure to revenues. particu larly during <'rises (Pc,,~(x'k 
<HId \ViSClnJIl, 196 1 and 197'1). Such a \·iew is Jssoci<Jtcd with the Keynesiun 
principle 01 compensalory finance, "hcr~by liscal deficits ar~ cr~atoo to ooost 
Hp the lcvel of~con()rnic anivity. Subs<XJucntly.through" built -in mcchnnism. 
the bllugctnry mu 1tirl icr circet wo uld ibelr cl imirmtc allY output gap 'lIld ~tlsurc 
a highcr tax base. from which the extra tax revenue wou ld he gel\crated to 
offset thc initially crcatcd fiscal deficit. [Jut. this is if government is 
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k=l k=O 
50 Others Podrecca and Carmeci Weinhold and Nair Davis and Hu 
and Erdil and Yetkiner 
Hsiao (l and Holtz-Eakin et al 
this 
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58 These countries include 14 for 14 for 8 for 10 for COMESA (5 












Table 5.1: Panel Unit Root Results 
Test Test Statistics 
and Chu: 
GREY -4.722*** -8.792*** 
(0.000) 
GEXP -22.911 *** -8.789*** 
and Shin: 
GREY -1.253 -1.878* 
(0.08) 
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59 This is also consistent with our discussion in section 5.2. Africa is on 







































Table 5.4: Non Test Statistics 
F test 
GREY cause GEXP 
SADC 0.94 
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Table 6.1: Coefficient of Variation on Government Revenue in 
Countries 
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IMF defines markets as those that are in the Markets Bond Index at 
the beginning of 2002 Costa India, Israel and Jordan. these 
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Figlll-. 6.1: C,i,ical Lenl of Debt "nd S"_'iti"it}, of R •• II"t.,. •. " Rote to Deb, Sto<k 
"I 1.2 
"m 
. . . . . 
6.6 Simulation Results 
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The lTImlel illu~t"ued in the prev i('lu~ :;<.><;tions is used to conduct simulations lor 
both fiscal rules u,ing Vlnnte Carlo technique5. fm initial debt ratio~ (do) 
ranging from 20 percent of GOP to 100 percent of GOP. To periorm the 
simulation' we cal ibrate the ini tial oil price level so that government revenues 
at the beginning of the simulation amount to 21} percent of GOP, which is the 
averag~ amount of government revenuc in Nigeria lor the past 10 years . The 
two sh,,·cks in the model. the oil shock v, and real rate shock Ct, are assumed (0 
be normally distribllted with zero mean and 2.5 percent variance and zero mean 
and 5 percent, variance. The debt ratio is then calculated using equation (9). 
and WOO replications of a five year horizon debt dynamic arc computed. 
Ari thmetic averages and standard deviations of these Irials are uscd in the 
quantitative analysis. 
In other to capture Ihe sensitivity of both rules to real interest rate levels. the 
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